Minimalism and the generalisation problem

on Horwich's second solution

Cezary Cieśliński

pp. 1077-1101

in: Joseph Ulatowski, Cory Wright (eds), Minimalism about truth, Synthese 195 (3), 2018.

Abstract

Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept various generalisations not provable in Th. The strategy will consist of the development of an axiomatic theory of believability, one permitting us to show how to derive the believability of generalisations from basic axioms that characterise the believability predicate, together with the information that Th is a theory of truth that we accept.

Cited authors

Horwich Paul