The ambiguity of being

Andrew Haas

pp. 9-22

in: Tziovanis Georgakis, Paul J. Ennis (eds), Heidegger in the twenty-first century, Berlin, Springer, 2015

Abstract

In the twenty-first century, philosophy still needs to raise the question of the meaning of being. We therefore, follow Heidegger's return to Parmenides—for being is neither a being nor a concept; rather, it is an essentially ambiguous universal. Being's ambiguity allows us to understand both why it withdraws from thought and why there is something rather than nothing. The problem for philosophy then becomes: How can we think the original ambiguity of being without disambiguating it? Heidegger's answer—ironically or not—is by not thinking it.

Cited authors

Heidegger Martin

Parmenides